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Disclaimer and Elective Share in
the Medicaid Context
Disclaimers must be handled with care
to ensure that they do not harm the
public, long-term care benefits provid-
ed by the federal Medicaid program.
Explored in this article are some dis-
claimer situations in law practice, as
well as various techniques to utilize this
estate planning method effectively to
avoid forced elective share. How can a
client plan for Medicaid and elective-
share challenges? Various means are
discussed and checklists provided to
help in this endeavor.
By Cynthia L. Barrett
Cynthia L. Barrett, J.D., is a past president of the
National Association of Elder Law Attorneys and a
Fellow of the Academy. Her solo practice in Portland,
Oregon, is concentrated in the areas of elder law, con-
sumer health issues, and retirement decisions.
isclaimer of an inheritance or gift
(sometimes referred to as renuncia-
tion) is a standard postmortem estate
planning technique. In traditional
estate planning, the disclaimant is
treated as though he or she never received the
inheritance. That is, the disclaimant is held not to
have transferred the inheritance to the eventual
taker.
In the debtor-creditor context, "[c]ourts have
generally taken the position that a creditor cannot
prevent a debtor from disclaiming an inheritance."'
However, this general rule is being eroded in recent
years by cases interpreting the effect of modern
fraudulent conveyance law on disclaimer. For
example, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a declarato-
ry relief action brought by the personal representa-
tive, denied a disclaimer after finding the dis-
claimant had actual intent to defraud his creditor.'
Where the use of Medicaid long-term care ben-
efits is contemplated, disclaimer is a dangerous
technique. Use of the standard technique of dis-
claimer may disqualify the disclaimant and his or
her spouse from currently received and future
Medicaid benefits. Where the potential disclaimant
(or spouse) has medical problems, and may seek
public benefits in the foreseeable future to pay
medical costs, the attorney considering use of the
disclaimer should be aware of recent developments
in the Medicaid law.
This article discusses the impact of a disclaimer
on only one type of public benefits, long-term care
benefits through the federal Medicaid program.'
Other benefit programs, such as public housing or
Medicaid linked to cash assistance programs,' are
beyond the scope of this article; however, exercise of
disclaimer can harm these benefit packages as well.
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Disclaimer as a Medicaid Transfer
Before 1993, whether a disclaimer was a disquali-
fying transfer for Medicaid purposes was an open
question. In 1993, after passage of the federal
Omnibus Reconciliation Act (hereinafter OBRA
'93),' the transfer-of-assets definitions for long-
term care Medicaid were broadened so that a dis-
claimer became a disqualifying transfer. The Health
Care Financing Administration (hereinafter
HCFA), which administers the federal Medicaid
program, expressly declared that "[w]aiving the
right to receive an inheritance" is an example of a
disqualifying transfer.6
Some states adopted administrative rules explic-
itly declaring that disclaimer or renunciation of an
inheritance constitutes a Medicaid disqualifying
transfer. The Medicaid agencies in several states
began to deny benefits to disclaimants and their
spouses. In 1995, a New York appellate court
upheld denial of benefits to a Medicaid recipient
who gave up her inheritance.' The court held that
"renunciation of a potentially available asset was
the functional equivalent of a transfer of an asset
since by refusing to accept it herself, she effectively
funneled it to other familial distributees."' The
court acknowledged that at common law a creditor
may not force an individual to accept a gift, yet the
court concluded that in the Medicaid context, pub-
lic policy permits the state to force a Medicaid
recipient to accept an inheritance and spend it
down.9
Every disclaimer, then, triggers a period of dis-
qualification for Medicaid benefits for the dis-
claimant and the disclaimant's spouse. The length
of the period of disqualification varies by state.
Calculating a period of disqualification is different
in each of the 50 states, because each state is per-
mitted to divide the transferred sum by its own
state's average cost of nursing home care. In
Oregon, the average cost of care is $3,200, so that
a disclaimer of $32,000 would trigger a 10-month
disqualification period. In a state with a $7,000
average monthly cost of nursing care, such as New
York, the same disclaimer ($32,000) would trigger
a four-month disqualification period.
What should the lawyer considering the use of
a disclaimer take into account? Ask if the potential
disclaimant is a current Medicaid recipient or has a
spouse who might need Medicaid. Ask who would
pay his or her cost of care, or the spouse's cost of
care, during a period of Medicaid disqualification.
If other funds are available to pay the cost of nurs-
ing home care for the disclaimant and spouse, per-
haps the disclaimer would still be useful.
How should the lawyer proceed if the potential
disclaimant is incapacitated and cannot exercise his
or her disclaimer right? Where the capacity of the
ill person is not clear, the state law on renunciation
should be consulted to determine who has the
authority to disclaim. The ill person may have
planned for incapacity and granted authority to
disclaim to an agent under a power of attorney.
Typical power-of-attorney language permitting dis-
claimer is as follows:
To make renunciations or disclaimers, including the
power to disclaim or refuse to accept an inheritance,
other property interests, and life insurance proceeds,
and to waive, release, disclaim or renounce property
or an interest therein, or the right of succession there-
in, including a future interest, in whole or in part.
In some states, the law on renunciation may
require permission of a court or a court-appointed
guardian or conservator. Complying strictly with
the renunciation law and time deadlines is crucial
to the disclaimer's effectiveness, as all estate plan-
ners know.
If the lawyer learns that the potential dis-
claimant is already receiving Medicaid, expect that
the disclaimer will be treated as a gift, that is, as a
disqualifying transfer. Congress considers those
who advise Medicaid disqualifying transfers to be
criminals, although a federal judge in New York
has enjoined enforcement of the 1997 criminaliza-
tion statute.10
Where the institutionalized person or spouse, if
not already on Medicaid, does not have sufficient
resources to privately pay for nursing care during a
projected disqualification period, the lawyer
should advise against disclaimer.
Disclaimer Situations in the Law Practice
In the routine probate administration, an heir who
stands to benefit from the transaction usually rais-
es the issue of disclaimer. The sick heir or frail heir
rarely initiates the discussion of disclaimer. In the
most complicated scenario, the lawyer is asked
about disclaimer by a person who serves as admin-
istrator of the estate or trust and is the agent or
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guardian for the incapacitated heir and also stands
to gain a greater share of the estate if the disclaimer
is effected.
Two recent cases from New York and Maryland
illustrate how unfavorably the Medicaid adminis-
trative agencies and courts are treating disclaimer
today." In Molloy v. Bane, the institutionalized
Medicaid recipient's daughter died, and the mother
executed a disclaimer of her intestate share of the
estate.' New York's Medicaid agency, and its
court, treated the disclaimer as a disqualifying
transfer. A close reading of the facts in Troy v. Hart
illustrates how convoluted a simple disclaimer
becomes in the Medicaid context. Troy was the
agent under power of attorney for Paul Lettich, an
institutionalized Medicaid recipient." Hart was
both Lettich's sister and the personal representative
of an estate benefiting both. Hart prepared a dis-
claimer for Lettich, visited him in the nursing
home, and helped him sign the document. Lettich
thereby gave up the right to a $100,000 share of
the estate. The agent, upon discovering the dis-
claimer, filed a proceeding to rescind the disclaimer,
and incidentally, to remove Hart as personal repre-
sentative.
The trial court eventually removed the sister as
personal representative, but it did not rescind the
disclaimer." Lettich died. Troy became personal
representative of Lettich's estate yet appealed the
trial court's decision denying the rescission. The
state of Maryland appeared as amicus curiae to try
to get the judge to throw out the disclaimer as a vio-
lation of public policy. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court and found that the disclaimer did not
violate public policy simply because it kept the dis-
claimant on Medicaid. However, the appellate court
did not stop there. It also fashioned a remedy for
the state that the state had not sought in this dispute
between the two personal representatives. The court
encouraged Maryland to seek reimbursement of
Medicaid benefits paid for Lettich from the other
estate heirs by a constructive trust.
The court pointed out that the Medicaid recipi-
ent was required to report all changes in financial
circumstances within 10 days." Lettich, the sick
disclaimant, should have notified the state upon his
acquisition of an equitable interest in his sister's
estate. "Lettich had an obligation to 'pay his own
way' (by means of the inheritance) until such time
as his resources were exhausted. . . . To permit dis-
claimed property to pass to transferees free and
clear of any obligation would be a violation of pub-
lic policy.""6 The court concluded that the dis-
claimer was valid, and that the sisters who received
the disclaimed $100,000 took subject to the claims
of the state of Maryland "for Medicaid benefits
improperly paid as a result of Lettich's failure to
inform DSS of his acquisition of property while
receiving Medicaid benefits."" The court called for
a 10-day notice to the state from a Medicaid recip-
ient contemplating disclaimer in order to give the
state a chance to disclaim. "The failure to do so
clearly deprives the State of its ability to exercise its
rights and may well result in the unjust enrichment
of those who surreptitiously dine upon the fruits of
inheritance while cloaked by the veil of non-disclo-
sure." 8
Disclaimer Practice Checklist
" Does the potential disclaimant now receive
public benefits? Review proof of the sorts of
benefits and the impact of disclaimer on that
person's eligibility. Who would pay if the state
imposed a disqualification period? Which
child signed the "personal responsibility" line
of the nursing home contract? Who has the
obligation to advise the state within 10 days
of receipt of assets by the Medicaid recipient?
Will the state seek "improperly paid" benefits
(those paid after the disclaimer) by direct suit
against the other heirs on a constructive trust
or other theory?
* If you represent the personal representative,
do not let the disclaimant believe you also rep-
resent him or her. Refer the disclaimant to
another lawyer for advice.
* If the potential disclaimant could be incapaci-
tated, determine who has legal authority to
sign the disclaimer document (court, agent, or
guardian).
* If the potential disclaimant, or the potential
disclaimant's spouse, might need public bene-
fits for long-term care Medicaid in the next
three to five years, because his or her
resources would not pay for $4,000 to $7,000
a month in nursing home care during a period
of disqualification, make sure the individual
receives independent advice about the impact
of disclaimer on Medicaid eligibility. Who will
pay for care during the period of disqualifica-
tion? If the disclaimant and spouse have long-
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term care insurance, or substantial savings,
they are less likely to need Medicaid during a
period of disqualification.
Elective Share and Medicaid
Some testators expressly disinherit an institutional-
ized spouse. Unless the disabled spouse seeks the
elective or forced share, the assets will pass to the
children or other heirs. At common law, the credi-
tors of a surviving spouse may not force the spouse
to claim the elective share. Recent cases involving
Medicaid and the elective share make it clear that,
in some jurisdictions, a surviving spouse's refusal to
claim the elective share will cause a period of
Medicaid disqualification.
All common-law states, other than the one
holdout, Georgia, "grant the surviving spouse the
right to renounce a testator's will and claim a statu-
tory share of the testator's estate."" Spousal enti-
tlement varies greatly, with some states permitting
claims against an "augmented estate" beyond the
probate estate.
In the nine community property states," the
spouses own equally the property earned by either
during marriage. The community property state
widow makes a "widow's election"-to take under
the will or to reject the will and retain his or her
share of the community property." The term
"widow's election trust" in those jurisdictions has
come to mean a trust of all the community proper-
ty until the death of the widow. Community prop-
erty state spouses interested in avoiding spend-
down of all assets on one spouse's care sign agree-
ments transmuting community property into sepa-
rate property, and they may also waive any state
right of homestead or separate maintenance rights,
if the state law permits such waivers.
Bypass Planning Is Common Where One Spouse
Receives Medicaid
In elder law practice, the lawyer frequently encoun-
ters an estate planning client whose spouse has
been institutionalized for nursing care. If the couple
protected some assets and the home from nursing
home costs by qualifying the ill spouse for
Medicaid, the healthy spouse may, and usually
does, alter his or her will to bypass the institution-
alized spouse to some degree.
Should the healthier spouse unexpectedly die
before the institutionalized spouse, the personal
representative and heirs usually wonder if the insti-
tutionalized spouse will continue to receive public
benefits. Inherited assets will disqualify the institu-
tionalized spouse from Medicaid and be spent
down for care. Of course, some spouses intend to
leave funds for the institutionalized spouse, know-
ing the spouse will then leave the Medicaid pro-
gram and pay his or her own nursing costs until the
funds are spent down.
If the institutionalized spouse was bypassed to
any degree, the lawyer advising the personal repre-
sentative should consider the issue of the elective or
forced share.
Simple Renunciation by Surviving Spouse
The lawyer who meets with the personal represen-
tative may learn that a spouse who is an heir by
intestacy or a devisee under the will is in one of the
following situations:
* In a nursing home (then the lawyer should
learn who pays for that nursing home care)
" Ill, but not yet in a nursing home (then the
lawyer for the estate should be aware that
Medicaid might be needed in the foreseeable
future).
If the decedent left the surviving spouse some or all
of the estate, then an interested person may ask
whether the spouse can disclaim.
Does the surviving spouse need separate repre-
sentation? Who is likely to challenge the disclaimer
for the disclaimant's lack of capacity? Help the per-
sonal representative understand the conflict
between the interests of heirs who stand to benefit
and the disclaimant. Do not let your clients get in
the position of the heirs in Troy v. Hart, where the
court advised the state of Maryland to seek return
of the assets by constructive trust suit.23 Simple dis-
claimer of an inheritance is a Medicaid disqualify-
ing transfer and will preclude immediate Medicaid
eligibility.
Failure to Claim the Elective Share as a
Medicaid Disqualifying Transfer
If the spouse is completely disinherited or receives
less than the elective share under the will, the
lawyer should explore whether the state can force
the surviving Medicaid beneficiary spouse to elect
against the will.
The elective share is a personal right of the sur-
viving spouse,24 and creditors may not force an
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exercise or levy against the elective share." Yet, in
the Medicaid context, some courts treat the failure
to exercise the elective share as a disqualifying
transfer. In several recent cases dealing with the
elective share rights of Medicaid recipients, courts
permit the state agency to deny benefits to a sur-
26viving spouse.
For the purposes of Medicaid eligibility, HCFA
defines "assets" to include items that the recipient
could get but did not receive due to action on his or
her part.
The courts have creatively interpreted the term
" action" in the HCFA State Medicaid Manual to
include a failure to act. In the lead Medicaid elec-
tive share case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found that failure to assert a claim against a
deceased spouse's estate constituted an "action"
within the meaning of the Medicaid transfer prohi-
bitions." In Tannler, Medicaid recipient Phyllis
Tannler received nothing in her husband's will.
Mrs. Tannler made no claim against her deceased
husband's estate, and the Wisconsin agency issued
a denial-of-benefits notice. She appealed, but the
agency decision to cut off benefits was upheld. The
personal representative of the estate eventually
paid Mrs. Tannler's forced share (a small sum in
this case) to the state of Wisconsin to resolve the
case. Substantial assets held in the decedent's sepa-
rate name passed to heirs under the will as permit-
ted by Wisconsin's forced-share and community
property laws."
Forcing the Medicaid Recipient to Claim an
Elective Share
To force the Medicaid recipient to claim an elective
share, the state Medicaid agencies developed two
basic approaches:
1. Issue a simple denial-of-benefits notice, and
stop paying the nursing home bill; or
2. Petition the probate court for authority to make
the claim for elective share on behalf of the ill
surviving spouse.
Both of these approaches have been successful.
State Issues Denial-of-Benefits Notice
Whether the institutionalized spouse is incompe-
tent or not, the state Medicaid agency can pressure
the recipient to make the election by issuing a
denial-of-benefits notice." In most of the cases, the
institutionalized spouse is incapacitated and a
responsible child or relative is overseeing the
Medicaid-paid care. The responsible relative may
be the person who benefits from the failure of a
spouse to claim the elective share. If the nursing
home is not paid, it looks to the responsible relative
for payment. Fearing nursing home collection
efforts, the responsible relative may simply cave in
and arrange to have the elective share paid to the
institutionalized spouse.
If the relatives stand immovable and the state
denies benefits to the elder, who will be paying for
the care? The child or friend who signed the
"responsible party" line on the nursing home
entrance agreement? Pressure from the care facility
to get the bill paid or evict the ill spouse for non-
payment may bring the interested persons to the
lawyer's office.
This article will not go further into the interest-
ing issues of relative responsibility for nursing
home care, the enforceability of responsible party
nursing home admission agreements, or the nursing
home transfer prohibitions. But where the relatives
do not pay, and the state continues to pay on
"hardship" theory after a disqualifying transfer, the
state could conceivably sue the relatives who bene-
fit from the transferred property for "improperly
paid benefits" under some state statutes.
State Involves Probate Court to Make Election
In Ohio, a probate judge sua sponte elected a
spousal share for an incapacitated surviving
spouse, as permitted by the state elective share
statute, to take the surviving spouse off Medicaid
benefits."' In 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld
the trial judge's exercise of the spouse's election. In
that case, the court relied solely on Ohio adminis-
trative regulations to find that the surviving widow
had a legal interest in her right to take against the
will. The decedent had left his entire estate to his
son from a first marriage. The probate judge
appointed a commissioner to investigate, and con-
cluded that election to take against the will was
necessary for the surviving spouse's future support.
In Oregon, the state nominates a private attor-
ney to be appointed as conservator of the institu-
tionalized surviving spouse. The conservator claims
the protected person's elective share. Where the
state chooses to seek appointment of a conservator,
the family can oppose the state strategy using two
arguments: (1) upon petition for appointment of a
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conservator, the family members can object to
appointment of a nonrelative whose interests are
solely those of the state, not those of the incapaci-
tated person; and (2) the family can argue that the
surviving spouse's circumstances would not be
altered or improved if the elective share were to be
exercised. In most cases, the ill surviving spouse
remains in the same bed at the same nursing home
receiving the same level of care whether the bill is
paid from the inheritance or from public benefits.
In a pre-OBRA '93 New York transfer case, the
court denied a petition to claim an elective share
where no actual improvement in care or benefit to
the impaired spouse would have resulted.
Oregon has no reported cases on this tech-
nique-all of these cases to date have been resolved
by settlement (many by payment of some part of
the elective share to the state-nominated conserva-
tor, who spends it down for care).
In a post-OBRA '93 transfer case, a New York
court ruled that a guardian was deemed to have
exercised a recipient's right of election against the
estate of a deceased husband to the extent needed
to provide for the recipient during a period of inel-
igibility.33 The best interests of a ward are irrelevant
if the state can get a court to rule that the guardian
is "deemed" to make the election.
Use of Revocable Trust to Get Around Elective
Share Backfires
In a very recent reported decision from
Connecticut, the court strongly criticized the avoid-
ance of probate by use of a revocable living trust to
bypass the Medicaid recipient spouse.34 In
Connecticut, the surviving spouse can elect only
against the probate estate.
Charles Bezzini, ill with prostate cancer, estab-
lished and funded a revocable living trust in March
1993. The trust contained no provisions benefiting
Mrs. Bezzini. On June 3, 1993, Mr. Bezzini died.
Four months later, Mrs. Bezzini went to a nursing
home. In February 1994, eight months after her
husband died, Mrs. Bezzini applied for Medicaid
benefits. The agency found that a Medicaid dis-
qualifying transfer occurred on June 3, the date of
death, when the sons became entitled to
$469,142.80 as sole beneficiaries of the husband's
revocable trust.
The Connecticut Appeals Court agreed with the
state agency, remarking that had the husband
transferred his property by will, no disqualifying
transfer would have occurred, and Mrs. Bezzini
would have been entitled to her elective share. 6
Connecticut permits the elective share only against
the probate estate, not an augmented estate.
Because a revocable trust was used, rather than a
will, an actual transfer of an interest of the spouse
occurred on the date of death, when the trust
became irrevocable and the trustor's interest was
extinguished. Use of the trust to bypass the spouse
and benefit the children backfired. Mrs. Bezzini,
who did not apply for benefits until a year after her
husband created his trust and eight months after he
died, was disqualified for Medicaid benefits.
Connecticut practitioners now ask questions
such as the following: If the ill wife fails to elect, is
that a disqualifying transfer of assets? If the spouse
leaves the ill spouse an income interest in a trust
containing the family home, would mandatory
payment of the rental income to the wife prevent
the state from claiming a disqualifying transfer?
Planning for Medicaid and an Elective Share
Challenge
In light of the harsh reaction of courts to the com-
plete disinheritance of the surviving spouse, the
elder law attorney rarely advises the client to com-
pletely bypass an ill spouse who may become eligi-
ble for Medicaid. Where one spouse is ill and on
Medicaid, the elder law attorney may simply sug-
gest that the client leave the elective share outright
to the ill spouse. If the spouse wanted to avoid
spending down the entire elective share amount,
the spouse could provide for "half-a-loaf" gifting
in his or her power of attorney.
However, some elder law attorneys are being
more creative.
Waiver of Elective Share by Prenuptial or
Postnuptial Agreement
Of course, some spouses may waive elective share
rights in prenuptial or postnuptial agreements.
Elective share waivers in prenuptial and postnup-
tial agreements are enforceable." However, at least
one court in New York deemed execution of a post-
nuptial agreement waiving the elective share to be
a disqualifying transfer."
The New York Medicaid administrative agency
issued a denial of benefits to Jeanette Dionisio,
declaring that her execution of a waiver of elective
share (two weeks before entering a nursing facility
and 20 months before applying for Medicaid) was
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a disqualifying transfer. In a very unusual twist, the
agency found that the period of disqualification
began with the date of death, not the date the waiv-
er was signed.40
Jeanette Dionisio executed a waiver of her right to
receive any property or assets from the estate of her
husband two weeks before she entered a nursing facil-
ity, and approximately 20 months before applying for
medical assistance. When her husband died testate four
months after she entered the facility he left an estate
valued at $469,500, and he had made no provisions in
his will to provide for his wife. Mrs. Dionisio's share of
her husband's estate would have been one-third, or
$156,500. The Westchester County Department of
Social Services ultimately denied Mrs. Dionisio's appli-
cation for medical assistance on the ground that, by
waiving her marital rights to a portion of her husband's
estate, she had transferred resources for the purpose of
qualifying for medical assistance. Mrs. Dionisio died
after this determination was made. 4 1
The estate argued that the postnuptial waiver fit
an exception to the regular Medicaid transfer
restrictions, in that it occurred solely for regular
estate planning reasons, and not for the purpose of
divestment of assets to qualify for Medicaid.4 2
However, the court held that a presumption exist-
ed that the postnuptial waiver of elective share was
for Medicaid qualification purposes, and further
found that the personal representative had not
rebutted that presumption in the hearing.
In the Medicaid context, transfers of assets
made "exclusively for a purpose other than to qual-
ify for medical assistance" are not disqualifying.43
Waivers executed long before an illness, as part of
normal estate and marital planning, should with-
stand scrutiny. When conventional postnuptial
agreements are done, which typically include
waivers of elective share, practitioners might docu-
ment in the agreement all of the consideration, so
that the estate planning (non-Medicaid) reasons are
apparent on the face of the document.
How will a state's Medicaid agency, interested
in forcing the Medicaid recipients to exercise their
elective shares, learn about the recipient's inheri-
tance after death of a spouse? Each state will gath-
er facts differently, but the estate or trust adminis-
tration advisor should anticipate the inquiry.
If an elective share waiver is a Medicaid dis-
qualifying transfer, when does the disqualification
period commence? Does the Medicaid disqualifica-
tion starting date wait until death, as in Dionisio?
Some planners suggest that the mutual waivers
of the elective shares be for consideration other
than mutual promises. Some also suggest the con-
sideration be creation of an elective share trust, of
one of the varieties below, in the will of each
spouse.
Creating an Elective Share Trust in the Will
Once an ill spouse has qualified for Medicaid, the
healthier spouse usually reconsiders his or her own
estate planning. If the institutionalized spouse is
disinherited, or receives insufficient assets to fully
fund the elective share, then the estate risks an elec-
tive share claim. In Oregon, the elective share is
reduced by the value of what is given under the will
to the surviving spouse. In some states, such as
New York, the spouse can reject what the will gives
and claim the share outright.
Public policy does not favor disinheritance of
spouses. In Utah, disinheriting the spouse is dis-
couraged-the omitted spouse gets the intestate
share unless the testator provides for the spouse
with other assets, or the testator declares in the will
itself that his or her spouse was intentionally omit-
ted." Many of our clients agree with this public
policy and do not want to completely disinherit the
surviving spouse.
Some of my clients with sick spouses on
Medicaid leave all of their estates to the ill spouse,
knowing that the inheritance will disqualify the
survivor from public benefits but intending that the
inheritance be used to pay the sick spouse's hospi-
tals, nursing homes, care managers, and other care
providers. The well spouse's estate plan should, of
course, include a spousal trust to provide manage-
ment of assets or income left to the institutionalized
spouse.
Healthier spouses may, however, leave only part
of their preserved resources to the ill spouse. If the
healthier spouse has revised his or her estate plan
to bypass the institutionalized spouse, and leave his
or her estate to the children, the elective share
rights of the institutionalized spouse may be used
by the state as a method of taking control of new
assets for spend-down on care costs.
The manner in which the elective share is satis-
fied will be different in each state. For example, in
Utah the electing spouse must allow credit against
the share for all sums received by him or her on
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account of the death of the spouse, including
entireties real estate and life insurance."
The lawyer should carefully examine the elec-
tive share law of the state(s) where assets are locat-
ed, and consider drafting a trust for just the elective
share amount of the probate or augmented estate.
Elder law attorneys are calling testamentary trusts
drafted in light of the elective share a "right-of-
election trust." These right-of-election trusts could
be full support, completely discretionary, income
only, or special needs in nature.
The right-of-election trust could be a full-sup-
port spousal testamentary trust, intended to be
spent down entirely on nursing and other medical
care, without regard to public benefits eligibility.
This sort of trust can be written with instructions
to disregard the interests of remainder beneficia-
ries. The right-of-election trust could be a fully dis-
cretionary trust, but this sort of trust is difficult to
value, and its value would not completely offset the
elective share. Alternatively, it could restrict pay-
ments in some way, and not be drafted as a full-
support trust. In Virginia and New York, a form of
income-only right-of-election trust is sometimes
used.
Virginia practitioner Andrew Hook drafts wills
for the community spouse leaving an income-only
trust to the ill spouse, which also permits discre-
tionary principal distributions for special needs. 6
In 1997, New York practitioner Vincent Russo
suggested using a right-of-election trust, funded
with all or part of the estate, to provide income
only to the ill spouse.4 7 As Russo pointed out in his
practice guide, the trust income will pay for part of
the care, reducing the payout by the Medicaid
agency. The Medicaid agency is less likely to claim
the elective share if the decedent's estate plan
reduces the use of public funds for the surviving
spouse's support. However, the New York spouse
may simply elect completely against the will, taking
33 percent of the assets, and the right-of-election
trust will never be implemented. In 1999, New
York denied benefits to an ill spouse who was the
beneficiary of a right-of-election income-only trust.
The effectiveness of the right-of-election trust in
New York is unclear.
The income-only right-of-election trust would
produce excess income in income cap states such as
Oregon. While excess income can be managed cur-
rently with an income cap trust,48 preserving bene-
fits while reducing the use of tax dollars, in Oregon
I have been developing a special-needs right-of-
election trust. The special-needs trust (hereinafter
SNT) is funded with the elective share amount. The
trustee is required to use income for special needs
and also has discretion to use principal for special
needs.
I have found that my clients routinely execute
new wills after a spouse is institutionalized. More
than half of my clients have chosen to leave the
elective share amount in Oregon (25 percent) to a
special-needs trust for the spouse. However, the
right-of-election trust in special-needs format does
not guarantee that the state will not claim the elec-
tive share.
A spousal trust in any form (full support,
income only, or special needs) pleases the clients,
who want the children rather than a state-nomi-
nated conservator to determine how the inheri-
tance is spent. Should the state seek appointment of
a conservator for an institutionalized spouse after
the death of the community spouse, this SNT
design permits the personal representative to argue
that simply spending down an elective share for the
$4,000-a-month nursing home bill will not benefit
the ill surviving spouse as much as special-needs
expenditures, and that the SNT should be valued
and kept in place instead of an outright inheritance
and spend-down. I am investigating valuation of
the mandatory income SNT. Evaluate the state elec-
tive, state statute, or common-law valuation meth-
ods in your own state.
For valuation purposes, if the Medicaid recipi-
ent spouse is given all right to income and the
power to appoint who receives the remainder, then
100 percent of the value of the trust will be consid-
ered in computing the elective share. But I am
reluctant to give the power of appointment to an
incapacitated person, because that might expose
the trust remainder to Medicaid estate recovery
under Oregon's expanded estate recovery statute,
or its successor, at some point in the future. I leave
the power of appointment out of the right-of-elec-
tion trust currently, but I am giving that issue fur-
ther study.
Should the state wish to appoint a conservator
to claim the elective share, the personal representa-
tive will argue that the will already leaves the ill
spouse a 25 percent elective share special-needs
trust. If the state is successful in forcing an election,
then the amount of cash to be paid will be reduced
by the value of the SNT.
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I have not yet had to value a special-needs right-
of-election trust in the crucible of litigation.
However, if the trust is valued at less than 25 per-
cent (the elective share amount in Oregon), then
additional resources may be paid to the state's
nominated conservator to make up the full elective
share. The conservator will spend down the addi-
tional resources for nursing care and other needs,
and when the ill spouse goes back on Medicaid, the
special-needs trust will be available to supplement
the public benefits.
Because the special-needs right-of-election trust
is contained in a will, and is not part of a living
trust, it need not have the OBRA '93 payback pro-
visions, and is not subject to OBRA '93 trust rules
that count all principal as an available asset of the
grantor or spouse.
However, I want to caution the readers that
nothing is certain in the Medicaid setting. I learned
of an unreported New York case, where the health-
ier spouse in consideration of the waiver of elective
share left a portion of the estate in an SNT for the
institutionalized spouse. The state ignored the SNT
and issued a denial notice. The elder law practi-
tioner argued, unsuccessfully, that no transfer
penalty should be imposed because the value of the
asset transferred at the time the waiver was signed
was uncertain. The trial court upheld the agency's
denial and imposed a disqualification period on the
Medicaid beneficiary spouse beginning with the
date of death. This case was eventually settled
before hearing on appeal, so no reported decision
was issued.
Elective Share Practice Checklist
1. In estate administration, is a spouse receiving
less than the elective share?
2. In estate planning, is one spouse ill and likely to
need Medicaid assistance with nursing home
care?
3. In estate administration, is a spouse disabled
and likely to need (or already receiving) public
benefits? If a renunciation of an inheritance is
considered, review the law on disqualifying
transfer in this article and give the renouncing
spouse (or his or her fiduciary) independent
advice about the impact on public benefits and
the additional possibility of forced elective
share.
4. How does the state where the ill spouse now
lives, or the states where he or she might live if
moved to be nearer other relatives, treat the
failure to claim an elective share?
5. In estate planning, do not recommend that your
client totally disinherit a disabled spouse-con-
sider the impact of the elective share claim on
the disabled spouse's public benefits (if needed).
Who will pay for the care if the state denies ben-
efits during the transfer penalty period of dis-
qualification?
6. Where the spouses are entering into a postnup-
tial or prenuptial agreement, be explicit about
the waiver of elective share. However, the other
estate planning goals that are relevant to the
clients' situations should all appear on the face
of the agreement. When one spouse is already
ill, understand that a simple waiver of elective
share might fall under the definition of a
Medicaid disqualifying transfer if the state
determines that the waiver's purpose was to
shift the burden of a surviving spouse's nursing
care cost from other heirs to the state.
Form of Special-Needs Right-of-Election Trust
(drafted in light of Oregon law)
DISCLAIMER: The following form is not warrant-
ed as suitable except to illustrate concepts dis-
cussed in this article, and may not be appropriate
for any general or specific use. The user is respon-
sible for determining how the form should be
adapted to any particular situation.
3.2 INSTITUTIONALIZED HUSBAND TES-
TAMENTARY SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST. I give to
the trustee, in trust, for the benefit of INSTITU-
TIONALIZED HUSBAND, one-fourth of the
value of my net estate reduced by the value of the
following property:
3.2.1 Property given under this will, including
the present value of legal life estates property
given outright, if any, and
3.2.2 The property not passing under the will
but received by INSTITUTIONALIZED HUS-
BAND on account of my death in any form of
ownership with right of survivorship, including
joint annuities, life insurance, life estates, and
jointly held real and personal property.49
My trustee shall administer those net estate
funds for the benefit of my disabled husband,
INSTITUTIONALIZED HUSBAND, for the
48
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spouse's special needs, as a supplement to any pub-
lic or private benefits which might be available to
meet the basic needs of INSTITUTIONALIZED
HUSBAND, according to the purposes and plan set
forth below in ARTICLE 6. The trust may be
known as the INSTITUTIONALIZED HUSBAND
TESTAMENTARY TRUST, and shall be adminis-
tered as set forth below.
ARTICLE 6
INSTITUTIONALIZED HUSBAND SPECIAL
NEEDS TESTAMENTARY TRUST
6.1 PURPOSES OF TRUST. It is the intention
of the trustor to create a purely discretionary sup-
plemental and emergency fund for the benefit of
the beneficiary, and not to displace any assistance
that might otherwise be available from any public
or private sources. In the event the beneficiary is
unable to maintain or support himself indepen-
dently, the trustee may seek support and mainte-
nance for the beneficiary from all available public
and private resources. The trustee shall take into
consideration the applicable resource and income
limitations of any public assistance program for
which the beneficiary is eligible. In carrying out the
provisions of this trust, the trustee shall be mindful
of the probable future special and supplemental
needs of the beneficiary, but not of the remainder
beneficiaries.s0 The trustor intends that the trustee
increase the choices available to the beneficiary so
that the comfort and personal dignity of the bene-
ficiary are enhanced by trust expenditures.
6.2 NO DISTRIBUTION FOR FOOD,
CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. The trustee is not
authorized to make trust distributions for basic
food, shelter, and clothing for the beneficiary.
6.3 SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS DISTRIBU-
TION. The trustee shall distribute to or apply for
the benefit of INSTITUTIONALIZED HUSBAND
for the spouse's lifetime all the net income, and so
much of the principal up to the whole thereof as
the trustee may determine, in his or her sole discre-
tion, to be advisable for the satisfaction of INSTI-
TUTIONALIZED HUSBAND's special non-sup-
port supplemental needs. All net income should be
distributed annually for the special needs of my
spouse. However, any net income inadvertently not
distributed shall be added annually to principal. It
is the intention of the trustor that the trustees dis-
burse funds from this trust only for non-support
needs. However, the trustee may choose which
non-support needs to meet, in the trustee's sole dis-
cretion, from the many possible expenditures
which will maintain the beneficiary's health, safety
and welfare when such requisites are not being pro-
vided by the public or private resources available to
the beneficiary, or are not otherwise being provid-
ed using the income available to the beneficiary.
The trustee shall make no payments for services or
products benefiting the beneficiary if the trustee
shall determine that payment for the services and
products is the obligation of any county, state, fed-
eral or other governmental agency which has a
legal responsibility to serve persons with disabili-
ties which are the same or similar to the impair-
ments of the beneficiary.
6.3(a) The trustor does not intend to displace
any source of income otherwise available to the
beneficiary, for basic support such as food and
shelter, including any governmental assistance
program to which the beneficiary is or may be
entitled. This trust is not intended to be a
resource of any beneficiary, and is not available
to the beneficiary. It is intended that a spend-
thrift trust be created for non-support purposes.
No part of a corpus or income of this trust may
be used to supplant or replace any public assis-
tance benefits received by or through any coun-
ty, State, Federal or other governmental agency.
6.3(b) To the extent that public benefits are not
made available to the beneficiary for other than
basic living expenses, including food and shel-
ter, the trustee may disburse for the benefit of
the beneficiary such amounts from the income
or principal of this trust up to the whole there-
of, for the satisfaction of the following types of
supplemental needs:
* Health insurance premiums
* Dental care
* Plastic or cosmetic surgery or other medical
care considered not medically necessary by
insurers or benefit programs
* Psychological support services
* Recreation and transportation
* Differentials in costs between housing and
shelter for shared and private rooms
* Supplemental nursing care and similar care
which public assistance programs may not
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otherwise provide, including payments to
those providing services in the home
* Telephone, communication and television ser-
vices
* Mechanical bed or other furniture with thera-
peutic potential
* Periodic outings and vacations
* Companions' expenses for travel, reading, dri-
ving, and recreation or cultural experiences
* Hair and nail care
* More sophisticated medical, dental or diag-
nostic treatment, including experimental
treatment, for which there are not funds oth-
erwise available
* Private rehabilitative training
* Payments to bring in family and friends for
visitation if the trustee deems that appropriate
and reasonable
* Private case management to assist the benefi-
ciary, or to aid the trustee
* Medication, drugs or treatment prescribed by
a physician or other healing art practitioner
for which there are not other funds available
* Fees and Costs for Protective Proceedings or
Criminal Proceedings
Expenditures for the above or other supplemental
needs shall be made only if public benefit programs
do not provide them, and only if the trustee deter-
mines in the trustee's sole and absolute discretion
to allow them. The above list is intended to be illus-
trative and not inclusive of all kinds of non-support
disbursements that would be appropriate for the
trustee to make. It is important to the trustor that
the beneficiary maintains a high level of dignity and
receives humane care.
6.4 SUPPLEMENTAL INCOME PAYMENTS
TO THE BENEFICIARY (AMOUNTS LESS
THAN DISQUALIFYING INCOME FOR PRO-
GRAMS). The trustee may pay to or apply for the
benefit of beneficiary's basic support needs such
amounts from the income of the trust as the trustee
may deem advisable, but in any event not more
than the sum which, when combined with other
income from other sources for the beneficiary,
would exceed the income standard of the public
benefit programs for which beneficiary may quali-
fy. For example, under regulations in effect at time
of execution of this will (1997), to qualify for basic
Medicaid as an SSI recipient, the individual may
have no more than $470 monthly income; to qual-
ify for home and community-based waiver and
nursing facility care, the individual may have no
more than $1,452 per month income from social
security, pension and other sources. In no case shall
payments be made directly to the beneficiary if
receipt of income will disqualify the beneficiary
from public benefits otherwise available to him,
using then-current payment standards.
6.5 PURCHASE OF EXEMPT ASSETS AND
TRANSFER TO BENEFICIARY. The trustee may
purchase items for the use of the beneficiary that
would be considered "exempt" assets for purposes
of public benefit law, such as personal household
items, transportation devices, medical equipment, or
a home. The trustee may, in his or her sole and
absolute discretion, distribute such exempt items to
the beneficiary. Once distributed, such items are free
of trust and the trustee need not account for them;
the trustee must report such distributions in the fol-
lowing regular accounting.
6.6 AUTHORITY TO INITIATE PROCEED-
INGS FOR ELIGIBILITY. In determining whether
the existence of this trust has the effect of render-
ing the beneficiary ineligible for any program of
public benefit, the trustee is hereby granted full
and complete discretion to initiate action to render
the beneficiary eligible for any such program or
public benefit, and is hereby granted full and com-
plete discretion to initiate either administrative or
judicial proceedings, or both, for the purpose of
determining eligibility. All costs relating thereto,
including reasonable attorney fees, shall be
charged to the trust. Should the trustee be request-
ed to pay for equipment, medication or services
which publicly funded organizations or agencies
are authorized or expected to provide, the trustee
shall deny such request. The trustee is directed to
defend, at the expense of the trust estate, all con-
test or attacks of any nature against the trust, and
has authority to settle or compromise such claims
if the settlement terms are not inconsistent with
the trustor's intent.
The trustee may cooperate with any guardian,
conservator or authorized representative of the
beneficiary to seek support from all available
resources, including but not limited to public pro-
grams and private programs, if the trustee deter-
mines that the guardian or authorized representa-
tive is acting so as to effect the intent of the trustor.
Any expense of the trustee, including reasonable
attorney fees, shall be a proper charge to the trust.
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6.7 PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS OF BENEFI-
CIARY. The supplemental needs of the beneficiary,
if such can be met within the terms of this trust, are
preferred to the rights of any remainder beneficia-
ry. The trustee may distribute all income and prin-
cipal of the trust, leaving nothing for remainder
beneficiaries, in order to accomplish the trust pur-
poses.
6.8 TRUST NOT AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT
OF DEPENDENTS. The trustee shall in no event
make distributions for the support of any depen-
dents of the disabled beneficiary.
6.9 NONASSIGNMENT/SPENDTHRIFT. No
interest in the principal or income of this trust
shall be anticipated, assigned or encumbered, or be
subject to any creditor's claim or to legal process.
Furthermore, because this trust is to be conserved
and maintained entirely for the special needs of the
beneficiary, no part of the corpus hereof, nor prin-
cipal, nor undistributed income, shall be subject to
the claims of voluntary or involuntary creditors
for the provision of care and services including res-
idential care, by any private or public entity, office,
department or agency of any state, or of the
United States or any other governmental agency.
No beneficiary shall have the power to sell, assign,
transfer, encumber, or in any other manner antici-
pate or dispose of his or her interest in the trust or
the income produced thereby, prior to its actual
distribution by the trustee for the benefit of the
beneficiary in the manner authorized by this agree-
ment. No beneficiary shall have any assignable
interest in any trust created under this agreement
or in the income therefrom. Neither the principal
nor the income shall be liable for any debts of the
beneficiary. The limitations herein shall not
restrict the exercise of any power of appointment
or disclaimer.
6.10 NEW YORK RESIDENCY. Should the
beneficiary live in the state of New York, or in a
state with restrictions on trusts such as New
York, then I direct that the provisions of Section
7-1.6 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law of
the State of New York, or any similar or succes-
sor statute thereto, shall not be available to
require any invasion of trust funds by the trustee
or any court."
ARTICLE 7
SPECIAL NEEDS TESTAMENTARY TRUST
ADMINISTRATION
7.1 RESIGNATION OF TRUSTEE. The trustee
may resign the trusteeship at any time. Any resig-
nation shall be in writing and shall become effec-
tive only upon written acceptance of the office of
trustee by a successor trustee.
7.2 TRANSFER TO SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE.
Upon acceptance of the trustee office in writing, a
successor trustee shall succeed to all rights, powers,
and duties of the trustee. All right, title, and inter-
est in the trust property shall then vest in the suc-
cessor trustee. The prior trustee shall execute any
documents necessary or deemed advisable by the
successor trustee to acknowledge transfer of the
existing trust property to the successor trustee, and
shall immediately transfer any property in his or
her possession to the successor trustee without
warranty. A successor trustee shall not have any
duty to examine the records or actions of any for-
mer trustee and shall not be liable for the conse-
quences of any act or failure to act of any former
trustee.
7.3 NO BOND REQUIRED. No bond or other
undertaking shall be required of any individual
trustee of any trust. However, should a Court of
competent jurisdiction determine, upon the appli-
cation of any interested person, that it is contrary
to the best interests of the beneficiary for the
trustee not to be bonded, then the trustee shall, as
a trust expense, be bonded in such amount as the
Court shall determine.
7.4 ACCOUNTING. The trustee shall furnish
at least once a year to the beneficiary, and to the
next nominated successor trustee, a statement of
account showing in detail all receipts, disburse-
ments, investment transactions, distributions of
both principal and income since the last statement
of account and an inventory of current trust assets.
The statement of account shall be deemed to have
been furnished to the person entitled thereto when
it has been placed in the United States Mail
addressed to that person at the person's last known
address even if that person is under a legal disabil-
ity. Copies of documents evidencing ownership of
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assets in the name of the trust, and a copy of the
most recent trust tax return shall be attached to the
accounting.
7.5 INDEMNIFICATION. The trustee may
require indemnification to the trustee's satisfaction
at the cost of the trust, before accepting the trust or
taking any step authorized hereunder.
7.6 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. Despite
any other provision of this instrument, the trust
shall terminate and be distributed as if it had been
terminated in accordance with its terms not later
than 21 years after the death of the beneficiaries
named in this instrument who are living at the time
of exercise of any special power of appointment, or
if not exercised, then at the time of the death of the
second of the grantors to die.
7.7 TRUSTEE PROTECTION SO LONG AS
TRUSTEE ACTS IN GOOD FAITH. In adminis-
tration of the special needs trust, trustor recog-
nizes that the trustee is not licensed nor skilled in
all possibly relevant fields including medicine,
social services, investment management, and pub-
lic benefits law. The trustee may seek the counsel
and assistance of experts, at the cost of the trust,
and of the beneficiary's guardian or conservator, if
any, and any State and local agencies that have
been established to assist the disabled in similar
circumstances as the beneficiary. The trustee may
use these resources to aid the beneficiary, or the
beneficiary's guardian or conservator, as appropri-
ate, in identifying programs which may be of
social, financial, or developmental assistance to
the beneficiary. However, the trustee shall not in
any event be liable to the beneficiary, the remain-
der beneficiaries of the trust, or any other party for
the trustee's acts so long as the trustee acts in good
faith. For example, the trustee and the beneficia-
ry's guardian or conservator, if any, shall not be
liable for the failure to identify each program or
resource that might be available to the beneficiary
because of disability.
7.8 NO COMMINGLING OF ASSETS. Public
assistance benefits of any beneficiary of this trust
shall not be commingled with trust assets but shall
be separately held by the trustee, should the trustee
be a payee or the recipient of those benefits.
Nothing in this provision shall be construed to
require the addition to the trust estate of public
assistance benefits received by, or on behalf of, the
beneficiary.
7.9 TRUSTEE DECISION FINAL. Under no
circumstances can any beneficiary compel a distrib-
ution from the trust for any purpose. The trustee's
decision in choosing among particular non-support
disbursements is final as to all interested parties,
even if the trustee elects to make no disbursements
at all. The trustee's sole and independent judgment,
rather than any other person's determination, is
intended to be the criterion by which disbursements
are made. No judge or any other person should sub-
stitute judgment for the judgment of the trustee.
7.10 TERMINATION. Unless sooner terminat-
ed as described below, the trust shall terminate
upon the death of the beneficiary.
7.10(a) TERMINATION OF TRUST BASED
ON ADMINISTRATIVE COST. If the trustee
shall determine, in the trustee's sole and
absolute discretion, that the market value of the
trust is so small compared to the costs of
administration that continuing the trust will
defeat or substantially impair its purposes, the
trustee may terminate the trust and distribute
the remainder of the trust property including
any accrued and undistributed net income out-
right as though the beneficiary had died.
7.10(b) TERMINATION UPON INELIGIBILI-
TY OF BENEFICIARY. In the event the exis-
tence of this trust for special and supplemental
needs of INSTITUTIONALIZED HUSBAND in
any respect has the effect of rendering the ben-
eficiary ineligible for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), or Medicaid or any other benefit
or entitlement provided by any public agency,
office or department of the State of Oregon, or
any other State of the United States or of the
Federal Government, the trustee is directed to
TERMINATE THIS TRUST and the undistrib-
uted balance of the trust estate, including any
accrued and undistributed net income, shall be
distributed in the same manner as if the benefi-
ciary had died.
7.10(b)(1) It is the trustor's wish that there-
upon the distributees shall conserve, manage
and distribute the proceeds of the former
trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiary,
but this request pertaining to management
of trust proceeds and trust distribution after
the termination of the trust is precatory, not
mandatory.
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7.10(b)(2) In determining whether the exis-
tence of the trust or trustee's powers has the
effect of rendering said beneficiary ineligible
for any State or Federal public benefit, the
trustee is hereby granted full and complete
discretion to initiate either administrative or
judicial proceedings, or both, for the pur-
pose of determining eligibility, and all costs
relating thereto, including reasonable attor-
ney fees, shall be a proper charge to the trust
estate.
7.11 DISTRIBUTION UPON TERMINA-
TION. Upon termination of the trust, the trust
shall be divided into equal shares, one share for
each child of mine who is then living and one share
by right of representation for the then surviving lin-
eal descendants of each deceased child.
7.11(a) A share established for a surviving child
of mine shall be distributed forthwith to the
child.
7.11(b) If a child has died before termination,
leaving lineal descendants, the deceased child's
share shall be distributed in equal shares to the
lineal descendants, who shall take by right of
representation.
7.12 GENERAL TRUSTEE POWERS. The
trustee shall have all powers permitted by Oregon
law to trustees, except where the exercise of such
powers will conflict with the trust purposes or with
the special administrative powers or restrictions
described in this article.
7.13 TRUST AMENDMENT. Trustor grants
the trustee the power to amend this Trust
Agreement to ensure that trustor's purposes are
met and that this trust is not considered a resource
or income so as to disqualify the beneficiary from
state or federal assistance. The trustee may not,
however, alter the remainder beneficiaries of the
trust. If the trust cannot be modified or amended to
prevent its existence from disqualifying the benefi-
ciary from public benefits, then the trustee shall ter-
minate the trust as if the beneficiary had died.
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